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ABSTRACT
Research and theory on ‘dependency’ and ‘care-giving’ have to date proceeded
along largely separate lines, with little sense that they are exploring and explaining
diﬀerent aspects of the same phenomenon. Research on ‘care’, initially linked to
feminismduringtheearly1980s,hasrevealedandexposedtopublicgazewhatwas
hitherto assumed to be a ‘natural’ female activity. Conversely, disability activists
andwriters whohavepromotedasocialmodelofdisabilityhave seenthelanguage
of and the policy focus upon ‘care’ as oppressive and objectifying. ‘Dependency’
is an equally contested concept: sociologists have scrutinised the social construc-
tion of dependency; politicians have ascribed negative connotations of passivity;
while medical and social policy discourse employs the term in a positivist sense as
a measure of physical need for professional intervention. Autonomy and inde-
pendence, in contrast, are promoted as universal and largely unproblematic
goals. These contrasting perspectives have led social theory, research and policies
to separate and segregate the worlds of ‘carers’ from those for whom they ‘care’.
Drawing on the work of Kittay and others, this paper explores the ways in which
sociological perspectives can develop new understanding of the social contexts of
‘care’ and ‘dependence’.
KEY WORDS – care, dependency, independence, inter-dependence, disability,
ageing.
A climate of dependence can in time corrupt the human spirit.
Everyone knows the sullen apathy of dependence and can compare it
with the sheer delight of personal achievement (John Moore, UK
Secretary of State for Social Security, 1987).
We are by our very nature both individuals and dependent creatures,
andanyplausibleaccountof‘thesheerdelightofpersonalachievement’
must make reference to that dependence (Mendus 1991: 23).
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In the context of the needs for assistance that arise from physical or cog-
nitive incapacities – the care which Parker (1981) termed ‘tending’ – it is
often asserted that those who depend on care have interests, needs and
perspectives that are radically diﬀerent from the people who see them-
selves as responsible for providing it. As argued in this paper, this is be-
cause research and theory on dependency and care-giving have emerged
from diﬀerent theoretical paradigms and proceeded along largely separate
lines, with little sense that they are exploring and explaining diﬀerent
aspectsofthesamephenomenon.Researchon‘care’hasexposedtopublic
gaze and to policy what hitherto has been assumed to be an unproblematic
and ‘natural’ female activity. Conversely, the disability activists and wri-
ters who have promoted a social model of disability have challenged the
language of and the policy focus on ‘care’, as oppressive and objectifying:
these perspectives have also recently begun to penetrate academic social
gerontology (e.g. Oldman 2002). ‘Dependency’ is an equally contested and
widely used concept. Although concepts of autonomy and independence
have received critical attention, they are nevertheless commonly promoted
as the antithesis of dependency and, moreover, as unproblematic and
universally desirable goals.
But are ‘care’ and ‘dependency’ really distinct phenomena, and what is
the relationship between them? Does the need for and provision of care
entail a profoundly unequal relationship, characterised on the one hand
by disproportionate power, and on the other by powerless dependency
(Orme 2001)? Or are ‘care’ and ‘dependency’ both multi-faceted con-
cepts which can accommodate a ﬁne rebalancing of power through the
recognition of interdependencies? Must a need for care necessarily be a
cause of dependency; do the concepts of care and dependency need to be
rescued?
These questions will be discussed in this paper with reference to the
needs for help and support that can arise in old age, and to the ‘care’
which is provided by formal welfare services and, informally, by relatives
and others. The paper draws on diverse theoretical and policy literature
from Australia, Britain and the United States. The paper ﬁrst outlines the
origins of the discourse of ‘care’ in British feminist academic scholarship
and in wider political debate, in order to make explicit the assumptions
and meanings which have become attached to the term. It then discusses
the complex and contested concept of ‘dependency’, and identiﬁes some
challenges to the conventional structuring of ‘care’ and ‘dependency’ as
discrete, oppositional concepts, particularly those that arise from demo-
graphic changes and from social gerontology and disability writing.
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the ways in which the tensions and conﬂicts between the languages of
‘care’ and ‘dependency’ might be reconciled are proposed. Kittay dem-
onstrated the importance of power relations in the analysis of care. The
paper argues that development of this approach holds considerable
promise for future research and policy in this ﬁeld.
Feminism and the discourse of ‘care’
Research on ‘care’ emerged during the 1970s and 1980s from several
concerns of feminist academics: to make visible the nature and extent of
the unpaid work carried out by women in the private domains of the
family and home; about the assumptions of both the economic and wel-
fare states that this labour was somehow ‘natural’; and about the im-
plications for social justice. Theoretical writing and empirical research
explored the position of women in relation to both the family and the
state. The assumption that women provide extensive unpaid care for
children and other able-bodied and disabled family members was made
explicit and elaborated: ‘[Married] women acquire a set of domestic du-
ties which include caring for their children, their elderly or sick relatives
and, of course, their husbands’ (Land 1978: 360).
Initially, discussion focused on the sexual division of labour in the con-
text of childcare and housework, but Finch and Groves (1980) extended
this gender analysis to wider areas of public policy. They ‘transformed’
discussion and debate by cutting through ‘the euphemistic language of
‘‘community’’ and ‘‘family’’ to argue that community care was essentially
about the care provided by women; and discussed the eﬀects of caring on
women’s life chances in terms of equality of opportunities with men’
(Baldwin and Twigg 1991: 118).
A stream, then a torrent, of studies emerged over the next two decades.
Feminist scholars argued that as the burden of caring in the home falls on
women, community care policies needed to be understood as regressive
and patriarchal, eﬀectively transferring responsibility from the state to the
family and, within the family, to women. Documentation of the extent of
informal care-giving by women and of the personal, material and oppor-
tunity costs associated with it, which were not compensated by state sup-
port, were central to this approach (Finch and Groves 1980, 1983). Shaped
by this paradigm, research focused on the so-called ‘burden’ of care, and
documented various ill-eﬀects that could result from caring for older
relatives, including stress, limitations and emotional impacts (for example
Nissel and Bonnerjea 1982; Wright 1986; Ungerson 1987; Lewis and
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origins in feminist theory and feminist critiques of the welfare state, par-
ticular attention was paid to the circumstances of married women of
working age (Brody 1981; Braithwaite 1989; Parker 1990; Watson and
Mears 1995, 1999). Where male carers were included in such studies, ac-
counts of their experiences were accompanied by evidence that many
received more support from statutory welfare agencies than their female
counterparts (Charlesworth, Wilkin and Durie 1984; Wright 1986; Arber,
Gilbert and Evandrou 1988).
This burgeoning research was matched in the political arena by
the emergence of carers’ advocacy organisations, and by policy initiatives
thatrespondeddirectlytotheseconcernswithvarioussupportprogrammes
for carers. A signiﬁcant and lasting consequence of these developments
was the introduction of the terms ‘carer’ and, in the USA, ‘care-giver’
(Bytheway and Johnson 1998). The carers’ movement appears to have
emerged ﬁrst in the UK where, from 1965, carers’ organisations have
consistently argued for compensation and improved support through
the ﬁscal, social security, health and social welfare systems. In Australia,
the term ‘carer’ was ﬁrst used in relation to home-support of older people
in a 1976 report, Dedication (Stephenson 1976). This was soon followed by a
members’ organisation that called for public recognition. Policy-makers’
responses to these campaigns have been in part prompted by concerns
about the actual and potential supply of people to care for older relatives,
because the availability of unpaid care is thought to be particularly vul-
nerable to changes in labour market participation and family structures
(Shaver and Fine 1996; Royal Commission on Long-Term Care 1998;
Pickard et al. 2000).
An alternative strand of feminist analysis, with very diﬀerent normative
overtones, emerged in the USA. Rather than emphasising the negative
(‘burdensome’) features of care, a discourse on the ‘ethic of care’ em-
phasised its socially positive and desirable features. In particular, this
literature highlighted the relationships in which care is given: ‘The ideal of
care is thus an activity of relationships, of seeing and responding to need,
taking care of the world by sustaining the web of connection so that no
one is left alone’ (Gilligan 1984: 73). Gilligan identiﬁed a distinctive set of
moral principles linked to ‘care’ which need to be recognised alongside –
distinctive from, but equal to – those of ‘rights’ and ‘justice’. At one level
this ‘ethic of care’, most evident among women, can be understood as the
outcome of a process of moral growth, in contrast with the rule-based,
impersonal justice often associated with masculine maturity. Gilligan
argued, however, that this gender link is not inevitable: ‘Development for
both sexes would therefore seem to entail an integration of rights and
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disparate views’ (Gilligan 1984: 100).
Other writers on the ethics of care, such as Noddings (1984), Tronto
(1993) and Sevenhuijsen (1993, 1998), have also sought to lift the concept
from its taken-for-granted origins as a ‘natural’, highly personal and
therefore essentially private activity undertaken primarily by women,
and to locate it in a wider arena in which relationships, responsibilities
and their practical execution are accorded social value. An important
theme in Tronto’s (1993) and Sevenhuijsen’s (1998) work has been rejec-
tion of Gilligan’s dichotomy between a (female) ethics based on ‘care’ and
a (masculine) ethics based on ‘justice’. They argued that care is a pre-
condition for justice, and that the right to receive and to give care needs to
be thought of as an issue of social justice. Because the relationships in
which care is given and received are characterised by vulnerability and
disempowerment, they argued that care needs to be subject to consider-
ations of rights and justice, not diﬀerentiated from it. This approach has,
in turn, been criticised from a post-modern perspective that challenges the
search for an over-arching concept (or meta-narrative) of care (Bowden
1997). The argument is that because the ethical dimensions of the concept
vary considerably in diﬀerent contexts (such as motherhood, nursing,
friendship, disability and old age), the attempt to elaborate a single set of
principles is futile and possibly dangerous.
The discourse of dependency
‘Dependency’ is also a widely used, strongly emotional, but essentially
contested concept, especially in the context of elder care. But while ‘care’
is a heart-warming concept with a positive valance, dependency is cold
and its connotations are almost entirely negative. Those identiﬁed as de-
pendentareassumedactivelytoseektoreversethisstatus.Therehavebeen
several academic analyses and critiques of the concept of ‘dependency’.
This section focuses on three aspects of the debate about dependency: its
complex meanings and aetiology; its status as an intrinsic individual at-
tribute or a social construct; and the appropriateness (or otherwise) of the
negative connotations with which it is commonly endowed. In practice,
however, at least some of the analyses and critiques range across these
themes.
There is ambivalence about acknowledging that dependency is a nor-
mal, indeed necessary, social condition. In private life, ‘dependency ties
people together. A child who is unable to depend on adults for guidance
would be a profoundly damaged human being, unable to learn and deeply
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selves who needed help, we would at best have a circle of acquaintances,
not friends’ (Sennett 2003: 111). In the public realm, however, dependency
has been made to appear shameful. Like the term ‘care’, dependency is an
ideological as well as a social construct (Fraser and Gordon 1994). The
ideological dimension suggests a broader use for the term than simply a
descriptor.FraserandGordon(1994)identiﬁedfour‘registersofmeaning’:
. Economic dependency;
. Socio-legal dependency;
. Political dependency; and
. Moral or psychological dependency.
Walker (1982) similarly diﬀerentiated several types, or causes, of de-
pendency in old age: life-cycle dependency; physical and psychological
dependency; political dependency; economic and ﬁnancial dependency;
and structural dependency. Gibson (1998) also proposed a typology that
included economic, political, legal, psychological and emotional de-
pendencies, each of which could be distinguished from dependency that
arises from age-related ill health or frailty. The latter applications of
the concept are particularly relevant to gerontological research, which
has produced an extensive literature on the measurement of dependency.
Each of these ‘registers’ of dependency has especial signiﬁcance for older
people. Moreover, they are not independent of each other: economic,
political and physical/psychological dependency may be wholly expected
and legitimated at particular stages of the lifecourse (Lloyd 2003). Further-
more, measures of one particular type (for example, physical or psycho-
logical dependency) may overlook other dimensions of dependency (such
as economic and ﬁnancial dependency) that interact with and exacerbate
the eﬀects of age-related disabilities (Wenger 1986).
This leads to the second area of debate, about the treatment of depen-
dency as an individual attribute or a product of social relations. Arguments
about the social construction of dependency in old age are well established.
Townsend (1981) cited pensions policies and residential care to show how
dependency is the result of intentional social and political actions. Both
Townsend (1981) and Walker (1982) drew attention to the ways that the
welfare state can create and legitimise dependency amongst older people,
and to the compounding of their exclusion from waged employment
through the institution of retirement by inadequate pensions and health-
services support. In relation to the kinds of dependencies for which ‘care’
might be given in old age, Wenger (1986) and Wilkin (1987) both pointed
to the ways in which conventional, medically-based measures of ‘de-
pendency’ – the ability to perform a range of daily activities – are highly
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conventional approaches to measurement are confounded by the as-
sumption that dependency is ‘an individual attribute rather than a social
relationship in which the behaviour and perceptions of all the actors
contribute to the construction of the situation’ (Wilkin 1987: 872). The
next section returns to the social construction of dependency in the con-
text of ‘care-giving’.
The third dimension of the dependency debate examined here is the
assumption that dependency is a negative state that should be alleviated
wherever possible by public policy measures, treatments or other inter-
ventions. As Fraser and Gordon (1994) showed, in contrast to its historical
acceptance, dependency is widely presumed today to be a negative
attribute amongst adults, in which psychological and moral failings com-
pound issues of legal, social or economic status. The goal of social, ﬁscal or
other policies is therefore assumed to be the reduction or minimisation of
this negative state. Negative connotations are also evident in demographic
debates about dependency ratios and overall ‘population ageing’.
Only rarely is dependency viewed more positively. Applying a typology
of dependency to her psychological and social research with older people,
Margret Baltes (1996) distinguished structural, behavioural and physical
dependency. Although the immediate impact of each of these forms may
be to deprive an older person of positive agency, each has a diﬀerent
aetiology and calls for diﬀerent responses. Baltes argued that, while it may
be desirable to adopt policies and interventions that eliminate structural
and behavioural dimensions of dependency, this is not possible with
physical dependency. Instead, she argued that to recognise dependency
amongst those who need help as a result of age-related disability is a
valuable ‘optimising strategy in that it initiates and secures social contact’
(Baltes 1996: v). She further argued that seeking and accepting the help of
others should be a positive adaptation strategy which protects and maxi-
mises the use of scarce resources and capabilities in other areas of life that
have particularly high personal value. In this respect, Baltes’s rejection of
a discourse that emphasises the negative aspects of dependency echoes
the feminist writings on the ethic of care that emphasise care as involving
the positive interweaving of a ‘complex, life-sustaining web’ of con-
nectedness between people (Tronto 1993: 103).
Challenges to the discourses of ‘care’ and ‘dependency’
Thus far we have outlined key features of the concepts of ‘dependency’
and ‘care’ and traced their development and use. Clearly there are strong
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may be a response to dependency; dependency is characterised by a need
for assistance, which may be met through the provision of care; and care
can itself create or deepen dependency. Yet the two remain distinct and
dichotomised ﬁelds, with considerable potential for conﬂict. In the next
section we identify two sets of pressures that require a more productive
approach: the changing demographic proﬁle of family care-givers; and
younger disabled people’s challenges to the dominant concepts and
paradigms of dependency and care.
The demography of ageing and care-giving
The emergence of the academic study of ‘care’ from feminist scholarship
on the roles ascribed to women in modern welfare societies may have
obscured other dimensions of care-giving relationships. As Baldwin and
Twigg (1991: 121) pointed out, ‘Much of the feminist literature has been
concerned with the unequal burdens of women in relation to the care of
elderly people, of disabled oﬀspring and other kin. This emphasis may
have obscured important diﬀerences that obtain where the dependent
person is one’s spouse and where considerations of gender are less clearly
dominant’.
Orme (2001) also argued that in feminist scholarship, men’s role as
carers has either been denied or been constructed as qualitatively diﬀerent
from that of women, although empirical evidence of the substantial con-
tribution by men to informal care-giving has been available for some time.
An analysis of the British 1980 General Household Survey (Arber and Gilbert
1989) showed that over one-third of co-resident carers of older people
(those likely to be most intensively involved) were men. Longitudinal
analyses have conﬁrmed that it is not only working-age women who care
for older relatives. Between 1991 and 1998, the number of men in the UK
involved in co-resident and intensive caring for an older person increased
absolutely and at a greater rate than for women in the same role. Most
striking was the increase in men caring for a disabled spouse – by eight per
cent per year, twice the rate of increase of women caring for a disabled
spouse. By 1998, there were proportionally as many men as women pro-
viding care for a spouse (Hirst 2001). According to the 2001 UK Census, 14
per cent of men and 12 per cent of women aged between 65 and 84 years
were carers, as were nine per cent of men and three per cent of women
aged 85 or more years. More men than women aged 75 and over now
provide between 20 and 49 hours a week of informal care, and more men
than women aged 75 to 84 years provide 50 or more hours a week (Oﬃce
of National Statistics 2003, Table T05).
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women continue to take responsibility for informal care, approximately
30 per cent of ‘primary carers’ are male; and for those aged 65 or
more years, a higher proportion of men than women report caring
responsibilities (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1999). Older carers
predominantly look after other older people (Milne 2001); indeed, in both
Australia and the UK, the likelihood of becoming a carer increases
with age among older people. Factors contributing to this shift
include the increasing longevity of men and a decrease in multi-
generational households into which older people have moved to live with
their children.
Research on informal care networks (Kendig 1986; Wenger 1994)
and other studies of the care of older people (Chappell, Penning and
Behie 1996; Bytheway and Johnson 1998) have challenged the foundations
on which the oppositional concepts of ‘carer’ and ‘dependent’ are
constructed. Most signiﬁcantly, for the purposes of this paper, the visibility
of older people (particularly older men) as carers suggests that, in shaping
patterns of care-giving, in this age group at least, gender is no longer the
most inﬂuential factor. Moreover, in the case of older givers and receivers
of care, it may also be increasingly inappropriate to distinguish
a ‘dependent’ older person (with a range of personal, health, social
and emotional needs) from a ‘carer’ (who meets those needs). It is likely
that both will have some needs; indeed the extensiveness and severity of
these may be ﬁnely balanced between the two. As one example, the
role of dementia in creating needs for care in advanced old age is
associated with high levels of stress and depression amongst carers (Melzer
et al. 1994).
Current socio-demographic trends therefore call for a revision of earlier
analyses which represented caring as a distinctively female activity, as-
sociated with ‘intimate relations’ in the ‘private places’ of the home and
family (Graham 1983: 16) and marking the boundary between ‘female’
and ‘male’. The relationships that provide an increasing amount of
informal care for older people are clearly shaped both by patterns of
reciprocity and obligation that have built up in long-term relationships
and by gender. Research on the experiences of disability and care-giving
in younger couples (Parker 1993), and the little that is known about
care-giving relationships among older people (Milne 2001), conﬁrm that
a rethink of the feminist carer-dependent paradigm is appropriate. More-
over, Baltes’s suggestion that the behaviours associated with dependency
can be viewed as a positive adaptation also oﬀers insights into the relation-
ships between older people through which they manage their physical or
mental limitations and negotiate care-giving and receiving.
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A rather diﬀerent imperative for the reconceptualisation of the care/de-
pendency dichotomy comes from younger disabled people. Like feminists,
the disability rights activists have challenged both the language of, and
policy focus on, ‘care’ and the conceptualisation of people who receive
care as ‘dependent’. Their approach is highly relevant for social geron-
tology theory and action (Oldman 2002). Younger disabled writers also
point out that dichotomising ‘care’ and ‘dependency’ assumes an absence
of ‘caring’ activities on the part of disabled people. In contrast, Morris
(1991, 1993, 1994) drew attention to the care given by disabled women in
their roles as parents and wives. Like other feminists, she argued that
community care is predicated on the availability of unpaid domestic and
familial labour in a way that exploits those women (and men) who provide
it. Morrids argued that this degrades and disempowers the recipients of
‘care’; she rebuked her feminist colleagues for treating caring as simply
another form of unpaid domestic drudgery and its recipients as little more
than a burden. In their concern to make visible the unrecognised and
unpaid elements of women’s work, feminists, it has been argued, have
displaced yet further the voices of people receiving care (Keith and Morris
1995).
Disability writers have also addressed the concepts of ‘independence’
and ‘autonomy’. Independence, they argue, needs to be understood not as
being able to perform activities for oneself without assistance, but as being
able to exercise control over whatever help is required in order to achieve
chosen goals and objectives (Brisenden 1989). For older people, Collopy
(1995) made a similar distinction between the process of making decisions
(‘decisional autonomy’) and the ability to implement, operationalise and
carry out those decisions (‘executional autonomy’). Thus, someone may
continue to exercise a substantial level of decisional autonomy, which
maintains a sense of self and personhood intact, even though the execution
of those decisions may involve others.
More recently, Shakespeare (2000a, 2000b) attempted to bridge the gulf
between the ‘discourse of care’ and the ‘discourse of burden’. He
reminded us that the concept of ‘dependency’ too often connotes negative
‘burdens’ and deﬁciencies on the part of the person needing help, and
argued that the voices of those needing help must be heard as clearly as
those who provide it. Drawing on the feminist ethics of care, he argued
that the ‘individualizing and excluding’ language of dependency should
be replaced by a recognition of the basic social condition of ‘interdepen-
dence’ and caring solidarity (2000a: 63–4). The potential of the notion
of interdependence for resolving some of the diﬃculties with ‘care’ and
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movement, his discussion is again highly relevant for thinking about de-
pendency, care and ageing.
Promoting ‘help’ and ‘interdependence’
Shakespeare (2000a, 2000b) called for the rejection of both ‘care’ and
‘dependency’. He argued that these two negatively loaded concepts
should be replaced by a recognition of human interdependency, and then
suggested that the term ‘care’ should be replaced by that of ‘help’, be-
cause it suggests the possibility of alternative forms of social support and
more informal, community networks and practices (Shakespeare 2000b:
71). These, moreover, can be underpinned by altruism and friend-
ship – values that arguably give greater emphasis to choice and genuine
moral and personal commitment, and which have the capacity actively to
engage both recipients and care-givers.
Replacing the terms ‘care’ and ‘dependency’ with ‘help’ and ‘inter-
dependency’ is an appealing linguistic solution to the diﬃcult dilemmas
we have considered. As Williams (2001) argued, friendship suggests a
meaningful, mutual personal connection, something that should be a fea-
ture of any good relationship in which personal support is a feature.
Similarly, the concept of interdependence has signiﬁcant appeal as a social
vision, and suggests a universal and positively valorised condition of
humanity. The alternative notions of ‘help’ and ‘interdependence’ can-
not, however, deal adequately with the problems of inequality and lack of
personal capacity that still need to be addressed. Moreover, both terms
pose the issue as inter-personal and eﬀectively preclude the role of the state
in managing risk and regulating resources and behaviours. If ‘help’ were
willingly forthcoming from friends and the community, there would be no
requirement for the state to intervene. Nor does an acknowledgement of
generalised social interdependence legitimate claims from individuals with
particular needs arising from advanced age to have access to the resources
required to assist them. While the idea of mutual aid based on values of
friendship suggests a pleasing and spontaneous willingness to provide as-
sistance, there is no sense of the need for long-term commitments; nor a
sense of urgency, need or priority in establishing claims for assistance. Nor
does this approach oﬀer a basis for providing help to those older people
whose extreme isolation provides no opportunities for mutual aid (Lloyd
2003). This approach, therefore, while initially appealing, suggests a
deeper unwillingness to confront the harder issues involved in making
political, economic and moral claims for ongoing support.
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placements for ‘care’ and ‘dependency’ is not to reject the insights that
these concepts oﬀer. As Gibson (1998: 205) observed, few deny that mem-
bers of ever more complex social systems will experience interdependence
as a result of their location in multiple, overlapping networks of depen-
dency. Indeed, this could be said to be a fundamental insight underlying
the sociological analysis of modern social life. Emile Durkheim noted a
century ago that in complex societies with extensive divisions of labour,
‘social cohesion occurs because one person is always dependent upon
another to achieve a feeling of completeness’ (Durkheim 1984: 21–22,
cited in Sennett 2003: 124).
From this perspective, interdependence can be seen as the result of
reciprocity between partners, exchanges between dependent actors over
time, and the networking of these relations of dependence. In other words,
to recognise ‘interdependence’ is not to deny but to acknowledge relations
of dependence. Kittay (1999: 67–8) spoke of ‘nested-dependencies’ that
characterise ‘exchange-based reciprocity’. Rather than there being an
expectation of direct and immediate reciprocation between care-giver and
care recipient, the exchange may take the form of a delayed reciprocity
or transferred responsibility, with an expectation that the ‘chain of ob-
ligations linking members of a community’ will lead, if the need arises, to
others who are in a position to respond. As one African-American woman
said when asked to explain her commitment to caring for others, ‘what
goes round comes round’ (Gerstel 1991: 20, cited in Kittay 1999: 68).
Building on this idea, we suggest that rather than abandoning the terms
‘care’ and ‘dependency’, a more promising approach is to recognise their
essentially contested nature, and to rethink and rehabilitate the meanings
inherent in the terms. In doing so, it will be necessary to recognise and
address the neglected issues of power that infuse both concepts, as Kittay
(1999) has recently done.
Care, dependency work and power
Kittay placedconsiderationsofpowerat thecentreof herimportantrecent
re-analysis of the concepts of care and dependency. Dependency, for
Kittay, is not an artiﬁcial or undesirable social condition, but a funda-
mental and commonplace aspect of the human lifecourse, an aspect of the
human condition encountered in early childhood, illness, disability and
frail old age. These are periods of ‘inevitable dependencies’ of the human
lifecourse (Fineman 1995 cited in Kittay 1999: 29; see also Lloyd 2003).
Cultural, social and moral conditions in diﬀerent societies and at diﬀerent
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and the social responses to them (Kittay 1999: 29). One result of this, it can
be argued, is that in advanced liberal democracies acknowledgement of
the reality of dependency is denied though the promotion of an ideal of
individual autonomy.
Providing care, the task of attending to dependants, is termed ‘depen-
dency work’ by Kittay deliberately to emphasise that the ‘care of de-
pendants is work … traditionally engaged in by women’ (Kittay 1999: 30).
She identiﬁed those who directly provide such care (whether paid or un-
paid) as ‘dependency workers’, while those whom they assist are termed a
‘charge’. (We use this term, like that of dependency work, in accordance
with Kittay’s usage, but caution against its wider adoption). Kittay ident-
iﬁed a paradigmatic form of dependency work in which daily, ongoing,
personal assistance is required. Following Martin (1989, cited in Kittay
1999: 31), she deﬁnes this dependency work as labour that requires the
three Cs: care, tending others in response to their vulnerability; connection,
building intimacy and trust or sustaining ties between intimates; and con-
cern, giving expression to the ties of aﬀection that sustain the connection.
The wellbeing of the ‘charge’ is the responsibility and primary focus of the
dependency worker. While the worker has responsibility for the ‘charge’,
the dependency relationship does not authorise the exercise of power
unless it is for the charge’s beneﬁt.
To examine the nature of power within and surrounding the care re-
lationship, Kittay made the useful distinction between inequality of power
and the exercise of domination. Inequality of power, she noted, is preva-
lent in dependency relationships although it is not necessarily a one-way
process, especially when care involves older people (Lloyd 2003). While
the care recipient is vulnerable to the abuse of power by the care-giver,
the reverse may also be the case; the charge may have power over the
worker as a result of social position, wealth, control of employment,
through forms of moral blackmail or through the worker’s (over-) identi-
ﬁcation with the charge. These sources of unequal power do not necess-
arily mean that abuse is inherent in the relationship, as the relationship
is, ideally at least, built on mutual trust and responsibility. Domination
represents a breakdown of this mutual trust by either the worker or the
charge. Kittay noted:
Domination is an illegitimate exercise of power. It is inherently unjust. The moral
character of a dependency relation and its nature as a caring or uncaring relation
is determined, at least in part, by how the parties in the dependency relation
respond to one another, both with respect to the vulnerabilities of the dependant
and to the vulnerabilities created for the dependency worker. Inequality of power
is compatible with both justice and caring, if the relation does not become one
Dependence, independence or inter-dependence? 613of domination. That the relation be a caring one is largely the obligation of the
dependency worker. That the relation not be one of domination is an obligation
that equally befalls the dependency worker and the charge (Kittay 1999: 34,
emphasis in original).
The vulnerability of care recipients arises from their lack of physical
or mental capacity. To counter this, moral opprobrium against their
domination by the worker is strong, extending into legal sanctions and
penalties that, although rare, may be enforced in either civil or criminal
law. The vulnerability of the care-giver in turn arises from her social
position, including the isolation of the domestic situation; from her
readiness to assist; through her identiﬁcation with the wellbeing of the
charge; and from the moral or legal constraints on her ability to express
annoyance or vent frustrations in interacting with the vulnerable charge in
ways that are normally acceptable between equals. A special vulnerability
of carers therefore arises from their dedication and sense of duty, and from
the ties formed through the care recipient’s dependence on their work
(Kittay 1999: 34–35). As noted earlier, recognition of the vulnerability of
dependency workers is a recent development, and the response in Britain
and Australia (at least) has been to provide informal care-givers with in-
formation, counselling and access to limited ﬁnancial support and support
services such as respite care. Support for paid care-workers, as reﬂected
in typical levels of pay and conditions of employment, remains equally
limited.
The analysis of power in the dyadic relationship between dependency
worker and ‘charge’ is thus central to Kittay’s account, although it is
only part of the picture. Equally important is the fact that dependency
workers, whether paid or unpaid, ‘have been made vulnerable to pov-
erty, abuse and secondary status … and often suﬀer psychological, sexual
and other physical abuse as well as economic exploitation’ (Kittay
1999: 40–1). Expressions of these vulnerabilities resonate in the claims
of carers’ organisations for increased recognition and material support.
Kittay explained this situation (which has not lessened with the in-
creasing participation of women in the labour market) as one that in-
volves a second level of dependency, one that might be described as
socially constructed, in contrast with the primary, physical dependency
of the charge. This second dependency arises from the fact that both the
‘charge’ and the dependency worker are sustained and protected by
their reliance on a third party, whom Kittay called ‘the provider’. In a
familial situation, the worker, as wife or mother, may be dependent on
a male provider, who assumes the position of breadwinner and head
of the household. In an aged household in a welfare state, it is in-
appropriate to speak of a ‘breadwinner’ and the carer is likely to be
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Kittay noted:
In the case of the dependency worker, the provider’s control of resources com-
bines with a general social devaluation of the work of dependency to thwart the
possibility of a comparable autonomy for the dependency worker. To speak of
this diminished autonomy is another way of speaking of the dependency worker’s
unequal relation to the provider (Kittay 1999: 45).
In this situation, as Ungerson (1997) has pointed out, both the recipients
and the providers of care are at risk of impoverishment and vulnerable to
exploitation. Kittay argued that if we lack the capability to care for our-
selves and therefore need support, we should be able to receive it without
those who provide the assistance being penalised. This too is similar to the
arguments of both feminists and carers’ lobby organisations for ﬁnancial
and other forms of support at a level that avoids impoverishment
as a consequence of care-giving. Recognition of the increased risks
of dependence in advanced old age, and of the need for care of those
who are dependent, must involve an acknowledgment of human inter-
dependencies. Such a concept is not an assertion of interdependency as an
alternative nor a negation of dependency, but rather one based on the
recognition of ‘nested dependencies’ that link those who need support
with those who help them and which, in turn, link the helpers to a set of
broader supports.
Kittay’s analysis recognises the issues of power and dependency central
to an understanding of care. Rather than avoiding the term ‘dependency’,
Kittay shows it to be an important and eﬀective conceptual tool for
examining the intersections between those who require assistance and
those who provide it. Recognising bodily dependency as the basis of claims
for assistance, and identifying a second, socially-created level of depen-
dency as an undesirable (and reversible) consequence of arrangements
for the provision of care, does not preclude acknowledging the rights of
both care recipients and care-givers to exercise independent decisions
and to optimise control over their circumstances. Rather, it provides a
sound foundation from which to justify claims for support. In this context,
independence is perhaps best understood not as non-dependence – a
structural notion that suggests the absence of practical, social or economic
ties with another person – but as ‘relational autonomy’ (Mackenzie and
Stoljar 2000). As Collopy argued, autonomy, which may be understood as
the exercise of a sense of a complete self, is socially created and deﬁned:
… long-term care … must recognise self-determination that ﬂows from an in-
dividual’s aﬀective metabolism, and expresses itself not in atomistic decision-
making, but through intensive sharing and interchange with family members and
Dependence, independence or inter-dependence? 615care providers. The principle of respect for autonomy … calls for recognising
the complex ways in which individuals compose their autonomy from their
relationships (Collopy 1995: 9).
Kittay’s analysis of care is as a relationship framed by power and sees its
obverse, dependency, as manifesting the relative powerlessness of both
carers and care-recipients. Despite her important and valuable distinction
between power and domination, we suggest that this analysis of power
remains underdeveloped. Further work is required to extend the analysis
of care as a relationship framed by power, drawing on a contemporary
notion of power as capability in which the underlying notion is not of force
against resistance, but of power as a form of empowerment – ‘power to’
not ‘power over’ (Clegg 1989; Collopy 1995). Power, in this view, is more
generally the ability to do or to aﬀect something. As Giddens (1984: 14)
argued, ‘[action] depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘‘make a
diﬀerence’’ to a pre-existing state of aﬀairs or course of events. An agent
ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to ‘‘make a diﬀerence’’,
that is to exercise some sort of power’.
Such an approach, we believe, may lead to a more positive evaluation of
care. It could help identify the ways in which both care-givers and re-
cipients might develop their capabilities – to eﬀect meaningful changes in
their own lives, to manage theinevitable dependencies of life and to reduce
or eliminate secondary, socially-imposed dependencies that deny their
attainment of autonomy – in the systems of nested dependencies that
constitute the broader system of relationships of care.
Conclusions
Along with the writers reviewed earlier in the paper, Kittay appears to see
care as a one-directional activity, done by one person to another. At times
she uses ‘care’ as a verb that denotes the work involved in providing
ongoing personal support, supervision and monitoring; at others, it is used
descriptively to denote special qualities. Both uses are acceptable, and
both conform to Martin’s criteria of the ‘three Cs’. Kittay’s cautious and
somewhat ambivalent use of the term care is, however, suggestive of a
deeper re-evaluation of the concept.
Recent studies of care suggest that qualities of reciprocal dependence
underliemuchofwhatistermed‘care’.Ratherthanbeingaunidirectional
activity in which an active care-giver does something to a passive and
dependent recipient, these accounts suggest that care is best understood as
theproductoroutcomeoftherelationshipbetweentwoormorepeople.As
Baldock (1997: 82) pointed out, ‘Social care is … produced and consumed
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‘user’ become part of the quality and success of the production’. From this
perspective, both recipients and providers are intrinsically involved in the
creation or ‘production’ of care (see also Finch and Mason 1993; Baldock
and Ungerson 1996; Baldock 1997; Ungerson 2000).
Other recent analyses have also emphasised the agency of both care
receivers and providers. Lloyd (2000: 148) argued that caring should be
understood as a ‘widespread activity in which we are all implicated’, and
that we need to ‘balance the rights of both people in the caring relation-
ship’. In calling for a rethink of care as a ‘relationship-based’ activity,
Henderson and Forbat (2002) argued for the recognition in policy and
research of the changing patterns of social relationships and care needs;
and for open acknowledgement of the tensions that arise in care-related
policy by incorporating the perspectives of care-receivers as well as care-
givers. Bytheway and Johnson (1998: 252–53) took the argument further
and asserted:
… although for the individual, care implies active involvement in a number of
one-to-one relationships (and this number may well be just one), these relation-
ships are normally set in the context of ‘ordinary’ networks of personal
relationships, networks which normally include a complexity and multiplicity
of care needs. … The person with ﬁrst hand experience will know that care
relationships are often mutual, that most people who are involved in both
receiving and providing care, albeit perhaps in very diﬀerent ways.
This perspective, they argued, revives an earlier understanding of care, for
example as articulated by Townsend (1963), as an ongoing and mutual
activity undertaken by older people and their relatives in the context of
family life. Recent biographical research on carers in Britain and
Germany has similar elements (Chamberlayne and King 2000). A recent
study that replicated the pioneering 1940s and 1950s investigations of the
family and community networks of older people also conﬁrmed the im-
portant contributions of family, local and wider social networks (Phillipson
et al. 1998).
Thus, both recent empirical research and theoretical critiques have
suggested that ‘care’ does not denote a narrow set of activities or tasks,
undertaken without the active engagement of the supposed beneﬁciary
(Rønning 2002). Instead, care is a complex concept that (with the excep-
tion of forms of self-care) cannot be undertaken by one person alone; it is
both an ideal and a daily reality, a set of practices and ways of going about
support that often falls well short of the ideal. It is a social concept that
deﬁes rigid deﬁnition, yet is helpful as both a normative, aspirational guide
and a term for describing our behaviour. Both levels present possibilities
for social analysis and create tensions between them.
Dependence, independence or inter-dependence? 617Neither ‘care’ nor ‘dependency’ have simple, uncontested meanings.
Both refer to a range of social phenomena that involve diverse charac-
teristics that extend from physical activities, through the social relation-
ships among individuals and groups and their positions in the transactions
of care and dependency, to the mental states or dispositions involved in
caring about someone or being dependent. Rather than calling for the
terms ‘care’ or ‘dependency’ to be abandoned, there are good reasons to
expect that both will continue to be used in policy discussions, research
and elsewhere. But neither term should be regarded as having a ﬁxed or
rigid meaning. Instead, the range of meanings embedded in both concepts
indicates important possibilities and ideals that create opportunities for
the active development of practices of human recognition in response to
lifecourse imperatives.
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